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A robust prediction of the celebrated Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) 
(BSM) option pricing model is that the volatility implied by market prices of 
options is constant across strike prices.  Rubinstein (1994) tested this prediction on 
the S&P 500 index options (SPX), traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
an exchange that comes close to the dynamically complete and perfect market 
assumptions underlying the BSM model.  From the start of the exchange-based 
trading in April 1986 until the October 1987 stock market crash, the implied 
volatility is a moderately downward-sloping or u-shaped function of the strike price, 
a pattern referred to as the “volatility smile”, also observed in international 
markets and to a lesser extent in the prices of individual-stock options.  Following 
the crash, the volatility smile is typically more pronounced and downward sloping, 
often called a “volatility skew”.
1 
An equivalent statement of the above prediction of the BSM model, that the 
volatility implied by market prices of options is constant across strike prices, is that 
the risk-neutral stock price distribution is lognormal.  Jackwerth and Rubinstein 
(1996), Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998), Jackwerth (2000), and Ait-Sahalia and Duarte 
(2003) estimated the risk-neutral stock price distribution from the cross section of 
option prices.
2  Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) confirmed that, prior to the 
October 1987 crash, the risk-neutral stock price distribution is close to lognormal, 
consistent with a moderate implied volatility smile.  Thereafter, the distribution is 
systematically skewed to the left, consistent with a more pronounced skew. 
These findings raise important questions.  Does the reasonable fit of the 
BSM model prior to the crash imply that options were rationally priced prior to the 
                                                 
1 The shortcomings of the BSM model are addressed in the context of no-arbitrage models that 
generalize the stock price process by including stock price jumps and stochastic volatility and also 
generalize the processes for the risk premia.  Many of these models are critically discussed in 
Jackwerth (2004), McDonald (2006), Hull (2006), and Singleton (2006). 
2 Jackwerth (2004) reviews the parametric and non-parametric methods for estimating the risk-
neutral distribution.  Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003) estimate the implied risk neutral distribution 
from a sample of simultaneously-expiring European index option prices while constraining the 
option pricing function to be monotonic and convex.  This approach may be extended to the 
estimation of the pricing kernel also.   2
crash?  Why does the BSM model typically fail after the crash?  Were options 
priced rationally after the crash? 
Whereas downward sloping or u-shaped implied volatility is inconsistent 
with the BSM model, it is well understood that this pattern is not necessarily 
inconsistent with economic theory.  Two fundamental assumptions of the BSM 
model are that the market is dynamically complete and frictionless.  We empirically 
investigate whether the observed cross sections of one-month S&P 500 index option 
prices over 1986-2006 are consistent with various economic models that explicitly 
allow for a dynamically incomplete market and also an imperfect market that 
recognizes trading costs and bid-ask spreads.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
large-scale empirical study that addresses mispricing in the presence of transaction 
costs and intermediate trading. 
Absence of arbitrage in a frictionless market implies the existence of a 
risk-neutral probability measure, not necessarily unique, such that the price of 
any asset equals the expectation of its payoff under the risk-neutral measure, 
discounted at the risk free rate.  If a risk-neutral measure exists, the ratio of the 
risk-neutral probability density to the real probability density, discounted at the 
risk free rate, is referred to as the pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor.  
Thus, absence of arbitrage implies the existence of a strictly positive pricing 
kernel. 
Economic theory imposes restrictions on equilibrium models beyond merely 
ruling out arbitrage.  In a frictionless representative-agent economy with von 
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, the pricing kernel equals the representative 
agent’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution over each trading period.  If the 
representative agent has state independent (derived) utility of wealth, then the 
concavity of the utility function implies that the pricing kernel is a decreasing 
function of wealth.  Furthermore, if the representative agent’s wealth at the end of 
each period is monotone increasing in the stock return over the period, then the 
pricing kernel is a decreasing function of the market return. 
The monotonicity restriction on the pricing kernel does not critically depend 
on the existence of a representative agent.  If there does not exist at least one 
pricing kernel that is a decreasing function of wealth over each trading period, then   3
there does not exist even one economic agent with state independent and concave 
(derived) utility of wealth and with wealth at the end of each period that is 
monotone increasing in the stock return over the period that is a marginal investor 
in the market.  Hereafter, we employ the term stochastic dominance violation to 
connote the nonexistence of even one economic agent with the above attributes that 
is marginal in the market.
3  This means that, if such an economic agent exists, then 
the return on her current portfolio is stochastically dominated (in the second 
degree) by the return of another feasible portfolio. 
Under the two maintained hypotheses that the marginal investor’s (derived) 
utility of wealth is state independent and wealth is monotone increasing in the 
market index level, the pricing kernel is a decreasing function of the market index 
level.  Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000), and Rosenberg and Engle 
(2002) estimated the pricing kernel implied by the observed cross section of prices 
of S&P 500 index options as a function of wealth, where wealth is proxied by the 
S&P 500 index level.  Jackwerth (2000) reported that the pricing kernel is 
everywhere decreasing during the pre-crash period 1986-1987, but widespread 
violations occur over the post-crash period 1987-1995.  Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) 
examined the year 1993 and reported violations; Rosenberg and Engle (2002) 
examined the period 1991-1995 and reported violations.
4 
Several extant models addressed the inconsistencies with the BSM model 
and the violations of monotonicity of the pricing kernel.  While not all of these 
models explicitly addressed the monotonicity of the pricing kernel, they did address 
the problem of reconciling option prices with the time-series properties of the index 
returns.  Essentially, these models introduced additional priced state variables 
and/or explored alternative specifications of preferences.
5  These models are 
                                                 
3 This line of research was initiated by Perrakis and Ryan (1984), Levy (1985), and Ritchken 
(1985).  For more recent related contributions, see Perrakis (1986, 1993), Ritchken and Kuo 
(1988), Ryan (2000, 2003), and Oancea and Perrakis (2007). 
4 Rosenberg and Engle (2002) found violations when they used an orthogonal polynomial pricing 
kernel but not when they used a power pricing kernel which, by construction, is decreasing in 
wealth. 
5 These models are critically discussed in Singleton (2006).  Bates (2006) introduced heterogeneous 
agents with utility functions that explicitly depend on the number of stock market crashes, over and   4
suggestive but stop short of endogenously generating the process of the risk premia 
associated with these state variables in the context of an equilibrium model of the 
macro economy and explaining on a month-by-month basis the cross section of S&P 
500 option prices. 
In estimating the statistical distribution of the S&P 500 index returns, we 
refrain from adopting the BSM assumption that the index price is a Brownian 
motion and, therefore, that the arithmetic returns on the S&P 500 index are 
lognormal.  We do not impose a parametric form on the distribution of the index 
returns and proceed in four different ways.  In the first approach, we estimate the 
unconditional distribution as the (smoothed) histograms extracted from two 
different historical index data samples covering the periods 1928-1986 and 1972-
1986.  In the second approach, we estimate the unconditional distribution as the 
histograms extracted from two different forward-looking samples, one that includes 
the October 1987 crash (1987-2006) and one that excludes it (1988-2006).  In the 
                                                                                                                                                 
above their dependence on the agent’s terminal wealth.  The calibrated economy exhibits the 
inconsistencies with the BSM model but fails to generate the non-monotonicity of the pricing kernel.  
Brown and Jackwerth (2004) suggested that the reported violations of the monotonicity of the 
pricing kernel may be an artifact of the maintained hypothesis that the pricing kernel is state 
independent but concluded that volatility cannot be the sole omitted state variable in the pricing 
kernel. 
Garcia, Luger and Renault (2003), Santa-Clara and Yan (2004), Brennan, Liu and Xia 
(2006), and Christoffersen, Heston, and Jacobs (2006), among others, obtained plausible parameter 
estimates in models in which the pricing kernel is state dependent, using panel data on S&P 500 
options. 
Others calibrated equilibrium models that generate a volatility smile pattern observed in 
option prices.  David and Veronesi (2002) modeled the investors’ learning about fundamentals, 
calibrated their model to earnings data, and provided a close fit to the panel of prices of S&P 500 
options.  Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005) investigated rare-event premia driven by uncertainty aversion 
in the context of a calibrated equilibrium model and demonstrated that the model generates a 
volatility smile pattern observed in option prices.  Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) 
extended the above approach to show that uncertainty aversion is not a necessary ingredient of the 
model.  They also demonstrated that the model can generate the stark regime shift that occurred at 
the time of the 1987 crash. 
Alternative explanations include buying pressure, suggested by Bollen and Whaley (2004), 
and behavioral explanations based on sentiment, suggested by Han (2006) and Shefrin (2005).   5
third approach, we model the variance of the index returns as a GARCH (1, 1) 
process and scale the unconditional distribution for each month to have the above 
variance.  Finally, in the fourth approach, we scale the unconditional distribution 
for each month to have standard deviation equal to the Black-Scholes implied 
volatility (IV) of the closest ATM option or, alternatively, equal to the VIX index 
(1990-2006 only).  Clearly, we have not exhausted all possible ways of estimating 
the statistical distribution of the S&P 500 index returns.  One interpretation of our 
empirical results regarding mispricing is simply that the options market is priced 
with a different probability distribution than any of our estimated probability 
distributions. 
We test the compliance of option prices to the predictions of a model that 
allows for market incompleteness, market imperfections, and intermediate trading 
over the life of the options.  We consider a market with heterogeneous economic 
agents and investigate the restrictions on option prices imposed by a particular 
class of utility-maximizing agents that we simply refer to as traders.  We assume 
that traders maximize state-independent increasing and concave utility functions 
and that each trader’s wealth at the end of each period is monotone increasing in 
the stock return over the period.  For example, an investor who holds 100 shares of 
stock and a net short position in 200 call options violates the monotonicity 
condition, while an investor who holds 200 shares of stock and a net short position 
in 200 call options satisfies the condition.  Essentially, we assume that the traders 
have a sufficiently large investment in the stock, relative to their net short position 
in call options, such that the monotonicity condition is satisfied. 
We do not make the restrictive assumption that all economic agents belong 
to the class of utility-maximizing traders.  Thus, our results are robust and 
unaffected by the presence of agents with beliefs, endowments, preferences, trading 
restrictions, and transaction costs schedules that differ from those of the utility-
maximizing traders modeled in this paper. 
Whereas we assume that returns are i.i.d. and that traders have state-
independent preferences, we also carry out tests that relax these assumptions and 
accommodate three implications associated with state dependence.  First, each 
month we search for a pricing kernel to price the cross section of one-month options   6
without imposing restrictions on the time series properties of the pricing kernel 
month by month.  Second, we allow for intermediate trading; a trader’s wealth on 
the expiration date of the options is generally a function not only of the price of the 
market index on that date but also of the entire path of the index level, thereby 
rendering the pricing kernel state dependent.  Third, we allow the variance of the 
index return to be state dependent and employ the forecasted conditional variance. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 1, we present a model for 
pricing options and state restrictions on the prices of options imposed by the 
absence of stochastic dominance violations.  One form of these restrictions is a set 
of linear inequalities on the pricing kernel that can be tested by testing the 
feasibility of a linear program.  The second form of these restrictions is a pair of 
upper and lower bounds on the prices of options.  In Section 2, we test the 
compliance of bid and ask prices of one-month index call options to these 
restrictions and discuss the results.  In the concluding Section 3, we summarize the 
empirical findings and suggest directions for future research. 
 
 
1  Restrictions on Option Prices Imposed by Stochastic Dominance 
 
1.1  The model and assumptions 
Trading occurs on a finite number  of dates,  = 0,1,..., ,..., ' tT T .  The utility-
maximizing traders are allowed to hold and trade only two primary securities in the 
market, a bond, and a stock.  The stock has the natural interpretation as the 
market index.  The bond is risk free and pays constant interest  1 R−  each period.  
The traders may buy and sell the bond without incurring transaction costs.  On 
date t, the cum dividend stock price is ( ) δ + 1 tt S , the cash dividend is δtt S , and the 
ex dividend stock price is  t S , where  t δ  is the dividend yield.  We assume that the 
rate of return on the stock, ( ) 11 1/ ++ + ttt SS δ , is identically and independently 
distributed over time. 
Stock trades incur proportional transaction costs charged to the bond 
account as follows.  On each date t, the trader pays ( ) 1 t kS +  out of the bond 
account to purchase one ex dividend share of stock and is credited () 1 t kS −  in the   7
bond account to sell (or, sell short) one ex dividend share of stock.  We assume that 
the transaction costs rate satisfies the restriction0 1 k ≤< . 
On date zero, the utility-maximizing traders are also allowed to buy or sell J 
European call options that mature on date T .
6  On date zero, a trader can buy the 
th j  option at price  j j Pk +  and sell it at price  j j Pk − , net of transaction costs.  
Thus 2 j k  is the bid-ask spread plus the round-trip transaction costs that the trader 
incurs in trading the 
th j  option. 
On each date, a trader chooses the investment in the bond, stock, and call 
options to maximize the expected utility of net worth at the terminal date  ' T .  We 
make the plausible assumption that utility is state independent and is increasing 
and concave in net worth.  Later on, we relax the assumption of state 
independence. 
One may formulate this problem as a dynamic program.
7  A s  s h o w n  i n  
Constantinides (1979), the value function is monotone increasing and concave in the 
dollar values in the bond and stock accounts, properties that it inherits from the 
monotonicity and concavity of the utility function.  This implies that, at any date, 
the  marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account is strictly positive and 
decreasing in the dollar value of the bond account; and the marginal utility of 
wealth out of the stock account is strictly positive and decreasing in the dollar value 
of the stock account.  Furthermore, as shown in Fama (1970), the joint 
assumptions that (1) the rate of return on the stock is identically and 
independently distributed over time and (2) utility is state independent ensure that 
the state space on each date is defined solely by the stock return realizations 
without additional state variables. 
Finally, we assume that each trader’s wealth at the end of each period is 
monotone increasing in the stock return over the period.  Essentially, we assume 
                                                 
6 In this paper we empirically investigate only one-month call options.  We first investigate the 
case where trading is allowed only once per month by setting  = 1 T  and considering the time 
between trading dates to be of calendar length one month.  Later on, we investigate the case 
where trading is allowed N times per month by setting  = TN and considering the time between 
trading dates to be of calendar length 1/N  months. 
7 A detailed description of the model is in an appendix available from the authors upon request.   8
that the traders do not write naked calls: they have sufficiently large investment in 
the stock, relative to their net short position in call options such that the 
monotonicity condition is satisfied.  The implication of the monotonicity condition 
is that a trader’s marginal utility of wealth out of the stock account is strictly 
positive and decreasing in the stock return. 
Our model assumptions are weaker than the assumptions made in the 
derivation of the capital asset pricing model.  Thus, our model implies that the 
pricing kernel is monotone decreasing in the index return but, unlike the capital 
asset pricing model, does not necessarily imply that the pricing kernel is linearly 
decreasing in the index return. 
We search for marginal utilities with the above properties that support the 
prices of the bond, stock, and derivatives at a given point in time.  If we fail to find 
such a set of marginal utilities, then any trader (as defined in this paper) can 
increase her expected utility by trading in the options, the index, and the risk free 
rate—hence equilibrium does not exist.  These strategies are termed stochastically 
dominant for the purposes of this paper, insofar as they would be adopted by all 
traders, in the same way that all risk averse investors would choose a dominant 
portfolio over a dominated one in conventional second degree stochastic dominance 
comparisons.  Stochastic dominance then implies that at least one agent, but not 
necessarily all agents, increases her expected utility by trading.  In our empirical 
investigation, we report the percentage of months for which the problem is feasible.  
These are months for which stochastic dominance violations are ruled out. 
 
1.2 Restrictions  in  the single-period model 
We specialize the general model by setting  = 1 T .  We do not rule out trading after 
the options expire; we just rule out trading over the one-month life of the options.  
In Section 1.3, we consider the more realistic case in which traders are allowed to 
trade the bond and stock at one intermediate date over the life of the options. 
As stated earlier, the joint assumptions that the rate of return on the stock 
is identically and independently distributed over time and utility is state 
independent ensure that the state space at the options’ maturity is defined solely by   9
the stock return realizations and not by additional state variables.
8  Furthermore, 
the joint assumptions that utility is concave and wealth is increasing in the stock 
return (the monotonicity condition) ensure that the marginal utility of wealth out 
of the stock account is strictly positive and decreasing in the stock return. 
We specialize the general notation as follows.  The stock market index has 
price  0 S  at the beginning of the period; ex dividend price  1i S  with probability πi  in 
state  = , 1,..., ii I at the end of the period; and cum dividend price () δ + 1 1 i S  at the 
end of the period.  We order the states such that  1i S  is increasing in i. 
We define  () 0
B M  as the marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account 
at the beginning of the period;  () 0
S M  as the marginal utility of wealth out of the 
stock account at the beginning of the period;  ( ) 1
B
i M  as the marginal utility of 
wealth out of the bond account at the end of the period; and  ( ) 1
S
i M  as the 
marginal utility of wealth out of the stock account at the end of the period.  The 
marginal utility of wealth out of the bond and stock accounts at the beginning of 
the period is strictly positive: 
 
() 00
B M >       ( 1 . 1 )  
and 
() 00
S M > .       ( 1 . 2 )  
 
The marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account at the end of the 
period is strictly positive:
 9 
 
( ) 1 0, 1,...,
B
i Mi I >=.     (1.3) 
 
The marginal utility of wealth out of the stock account at the end of the 
period is strictly positive and decreasing in the stock return: 
                                                 
8 One may replace the assumption of i.i.d. returns with the assumption that the investment 
horizon ends on date one,  == '1 TT . 
9 Since the value of the bond account at the end of the period is independent of the state i, we 
cannot impose the condition that the marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account is 
decreasing in the dollar value of the bond account.   10
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 12 1 1 ... 1 0
SS S
I MM M ≥≥ ≥> .   (1.4) 
 
On each date, the trader may transfer funds between the bond and stock 
accounts and incurs transaction costs.  Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution 
between the bond and stock accounts differs from unity by, at most, the transaction 
costs rate: 
 
() () () () () −≤ ≤ + 10 0 10
BS B kM M kM    (1.5) 
and 
() () () () () −≤ ≤ + = 1 1 1 1 1 , 1,...,
BS B
ii i kM M kM i I . (1.6) 
 
Marginal analysis on the bond holdings leads to the following condition on 
the marginal rate of substitution between the bond holdings at the beginning and 











= ∑ ,     (1.7) 
 
where  R is one plus the risk free rate.  Marginal analysis on the stock holdings 
leads to the following condition on the marginal rate of substitution between the 
stock holdings at the beginning of the period and the bond and stock holdings at 


















⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ .   (1.8) 
 
Marginal analysis on the option holdings leads to the following condition on 
the marginal rate of substitution between the option holdings at the beginning of 
the period and the option holdings ( ij X ) at the end of the period: 
 
() () () () ()
1
0 1 0 , 1,...,
I
BB B
jj i i i j jj
i
Pk M M X Pk M j J π
=
−≤ ≤ + = ∑ . (1.9)   11
 
Each month in our empirical analysis, we check for feasibility of conditions 
(1.1)-(1.9) by using the linear programming features of the optimization toolbox of 
MATLAB 7.0.  We report the percentage of months in which the conditions are 
feasible and, therefore, stochastic dominance is ruled out. 
 
1.3 Restrictions  in  the two-period model 
We relax the assumption of the single-period model that, over the one-month life of 
the options, markets for trading are open only at the beginning and end of the 
period; we allow for a third trading date in the middle of the month.  We define the 
marginal utility of wealth out of the bond account and out of the stock account at 
each one of the three trading dates and set up the linear program as a direct 
extension of the program (1.1)-(1.9) in Section 1.2.  The explicit program is given in 
Appendix A.  In our empirical analysis, we report the percentage of months in 
which the conditions are feasible and, therefore, stochastic dominance is ruled out. 
 
1.4  Restrictions in the multiperiod model 
In principle, we may allow for more than one intermediate trading dates over the 
one-month life of the options.  However, the numerical implementation becomes 
tedious as both the number of constraints and variables in the linear program 
increase exponentially in the number of intermediate trading dates. 
Constantinides and Perrakis (2002) derived testable implications of the 
absence of stochastic dominance that are invariant to the allowed frequency of 
trading the bond and stock over the life of the options.  This generality is achieved 
under the assumption that the trader’s universe of assets consists of the bond, 
stock, and a one-month call option with a certain strike price.  Specifically, 
Constantinides and Perrakis (2002) derived an upper and a lower bound to the 
price of a call option of given strike and maturity.  The bounds have the following 
interpretation.  If one can buy the option for less than the lower bound, then there 
is a stochastic dominance violation between the bond, stock, and the given option.  
Likewise, if one can write the option for more than the upper bound, then again   12
there is a stochastic dominance violation between the bond, stock, and the given 
option.
10 
Below, we state without proof the bounds on call options.  At any time t 
prior to expiration, the following is a partition-independent upper bound on the 









cS E S K S
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+ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ −
,    (1.10) 
 
where  S R  is the expected return on the stock per period. 
A lower bound for a call option can also be found, but only if it is 
additionally assumed that there exists at least one trader for whom the investment 
horizon coincides with the option expiration.  In such a case, transaction costs 





tt S  ( ,  t)  1+ S -  / [( ) S ]/R
Tt
tT cS K R E K S δ
−+ =+ − ,   (1.11) 
 
where  R  is one plus the risk free rate per period.  We present the upper and lower 
bounds in Figures 1-4 and discuss their violations in Section 2.6. 
                                                 
10 These bounds on call prices (and the corresponding bounds on put prices) may not be the 
tightest possible bounds for any given frequency of trading.  However, they are presented here 
because of their universality in that they do not depend on the frequency of trading over the life 
of the option.  For a comprehensive discussion and derivation of these and other, possibly tighter, 
bounds that are specific to the allowed frequency of trading, see Constantinides and Perrakis 
(2002).  Constantinides and Perrakis (2007) provided bounds for American-style options and 
futures options.  These bounds were tested with data on S&P 500 futures options by 
Constantinides, Czerwonko, Jackwerth and Perrakis (2007), who identified options violating the 
bounds and derived strategies exploiting these mispricings.  For alternative approaches to option 
bounds under transaction costs see also Constantinides and Zariphopoulou (1999, 2001), Leland 
(1985) and Bensaid et al (1992). 
11 In the special case of zero transaction costs, the assumption  = ' TT  is redundant because the 
put-call parity holds.   13
2  Empirical Results 
 
2.1 Data  and  estimation 
We use the historical daily record of the S&P 500 index and its daily dividend 
record over the period 1928-2006.  The monthly index return is based on 30 
calendar day (21 trading day) returns.  In order to avoid difficulties with the 
estimated historical mean of the returns, we demean all our samples and 
reintroduce a mean 4% annualized premium over the risk free rate.  Our results 
remain practically unchanged if we do not make this adjustment because the prices 
of one-month options are insensitive to the expected return on the stock. 
We estimate both the unconditional and the conditional distribution of the 
index.  The unconditional distribution is extracted from four alternative samples of 
thirty-day index returns: two historical returns samples over the periods 1928-1986 
and 1972-1986; a forward-looking returns sample over the period 1987-2006 that 
includes the 1987 stock market crash; and a forward-looking returns sample over 
the period 1988-2006 that excludes the stock market crash.  The annualized 
volatility is 21.0% (1928-1986), 15.8% (1972-1986), 15.2% (1987-2006), and 14.8% 
(1988-2006). 
For each sample, we use a discrete state space of 61 values from e
-0.60 to e
0.60, 
spaced 0.02 apart in log spacing.  Such span covers all observed returns in any of 
our samples.  We use the standard Gaussian kernel of Silverman (1986, pp. 15, 43, 
and 45).  The resulting probabilities for different states can vary greatly in scale 
and cause numerical problems in solving the resulting LPs.  We thus resort to 
eliminating states with probabilities smaller than 0.00001 and rescaling the 
remaining probabilities (typically 99.998%) to sum to one. 
We estimate the conditional distribution of the index each month over the 
period 1972-2006 in three different ways: by GARCH (1,1), as the implied volatility 
(IV), and as the revised VIX index.
12  In the first way, we apply the semi-
                                                 
12 An alternative Wall Street approach of obtaining a conditional distribution is to bootstrap from 22 
day overlapping returns with a rolling window of several months where each day is the beginning of 
another 22 day return.  100 days is a common choice.  We are indebted to an anonymous referee of 
this journal for pointing out this alternative approach.   14
parametric GARCH (1,1) method of Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera (1991), a method 
that does not impose the restriction that conditional returns are normally 
distributed, as explained in Appendix C.
13  In the second way, we estimate the 
conditional volatility as the Black-Scholes IV of the closest ATM 1-month option 
and scale the unconditional distribution every month to match the conditional 
volatility.  In the third way, we estimate the conditional volatility as 0.01 times the 
revised VIX index and scale the unconditional distribution every month over the 
subperiod 1990-2006 (when the VIX index is available) to match the conditional 
volatility.
14 
For the S&P 500 index options we use two data sources.  For the period 
1986-1995, we use the tick-by-tick Berkeley Options Database of all quotes and 
trades.  We focus on the most liquid call options with K/S ratio (moneyness) in the 
range 0.90-1.05.  For 107 months we retain only the call option quotes for the day 
corresponding to options thirty days to expiration.
15  For each day retained in the 
sample, we aggregate the quotes to the minute and pick the minute between 9:00-
11:00 AM with the most quotes as our cross section for the month.  We present 
these quotes in terms of their bid and ask implied volatilities.  Details on this 
database are provided in Appendix B, Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), and 
Jackwerth (2000). 
                                                 
13 The index return sample and the option price sample do not align.  We use the conditional 
volatility of the 30-day return period which starts before the option sample and covers it partly at 
the beginning.  We recalculated the results by using the conditional volatility of the 30-day return 
period which starts during the option sample and covers it partly at the end and then continues 
beyond the option sample.  The two sets of results are practically indistinguishable and thus, we 
do not report the latter results here. 
14 The scaling of the distribution by the conditional volatility does not change the skewness and 
kurtosis.  However, our numerical implementation does cause these moments to vary slightly due to 
slightly different discretizations.  For the 30-day conditional index return distribution, 1972-2006, 
based on GARCH (1,1), the average skewness is -0.415765 and kurtosis is 1.693435; based on implied 
volatilities, the average skewness is -0.393942 and kurtosis is 1.650050. 
15 We lose 9 months for which we do not have sufficient data, i.e., months with less than five 
different strike prices, months after the crash of October 1987 until June 1988, and months before 
the introduction of S&P 500 index options in April 1986.   15
We do not have options data for 1996.  For the period 1997-2006, we obtain 
call option bid and ask prices from the Option Metrics Database, described in 
Appendix B.  We calculate a hypothetical noon option cross section from the 
closing cross section and the index observed at noon and the close.  Here we assume 
that the implied volatilities do not change between noon and the close.  We start 
out with 109 raw cross sections and are left with 108 final cross sections.  The time 
to expiration is 29 days. 
Since the Berkeley Options Database provides less noisy data than the 
Option Metrics Database, we expect a higher incidence of stochastic dominance 
violations over the 1997-2006 period than over the 1986-1995 period.  Thus we are 
cautious in comparing results across these two periods. 
 
2.2  Assumptions on bid-ask spreads and trading fees 
There is no presumption that all agents in the economy face the same bid-ask 
spreads and transaction costs as the traders do.  We assume that the traders are 
subject to the following bid-ask spreads and trading fees.  For the index, we model 
the combined one-half bid-ask spread and one-way trading fee as a one-way 
proportional transaction costs rate equal to 50 bps of the index price. 
For the options, we model the combined one-half bid-ask spread and one-
way trading fee either as fixed or as proportional transaction costs.  Under the 
fixed-costs regime, we set the fixed transaction costs equal to 5, 10, or 20 bps of the 
index price.  This corresponds to about 19, 38, or 75 cents one-way fee per call, 
respectively.  Fixed transaction costs probably overstate the actual transaction 
costs on OTM calls and understate them on ITM calls. 
Under the proportional-costs regime, the proportional transaction costs for 
an ATM call are set equal to the transaction costs under the fixed-costs regime.  
However, for an OTM (or, ITM) call with price equal to fraction (or, multiple) x of 
the price of the ATM call, the proportional transaction costs are equal to fraction 
(or, multiple) x of the transaction costs of the ATM call.  Proportional transaction 
costs probably understate the actual transaction costs on OTM calls and overstate 
them on ITM calls.  In the tables, we present results under both fixed-cost and 
proportional-cost regimes.   16
 
2.3  Stochastic dominance violations in the single-period case 
Each month we check for the feasibility of conditions (1.1)-(1.9).  Infeasibility of 
these conditions implies stochastic dominance: any trader can improve her utility 
by trading in these assets without incurring any out-of-pocket costs.  If we rule out 
bid-ask spreads and trading fees, we find that these conditions are violated in all 
months.  Thus, we introduce bid-ask spreads and trading fees as described in 
Section 2.2. 
The time series of option prices is divided into seven periods and stochastic 
dominance violations in each period are reported in different columns, labeled as 
panels A-G in Tables 1-4.  The first period extends from May 1986 to October 16, 
1987, just prior to the crash.  The other six periods are all post-crash and span July 
1988 to March 1991, April 1991 to August 1993, September 1993 to December 1995, 
February 1997 to December 1999, February 2000 to May 2003 and June 2003 to 
May 2006.  Note that we do not have options data for 1996 from either data source.  
The average annualized implied volatility is 0.1641 and the panel averages are 
0.1753 (A), 0.179 (B), 0.1307 (C), 0.1089 (D), 0.2 (E), 0.2173 (F), and 0.1228 (G). 
In Table 1A, the one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The 
transaction costs on the options are proportional.  In each row, the one-way 
transaction costs rate on the ATM calls is 5 bps of the index price (top entries), 10 
bps (bold middle entries), or 20 bps (bottom entries).  The number of calls in each 
(filtered) monthly cross section fluctuates between 5 and 23 with median 10.  The 
percentages of months without stochastic dominance violations are the entries 
displayed in bold.  The bracketed numbers in the first row are bootstrap standard 
deviations of the first-row middle entries (10 bps transaction costs), based on 200 
samples of the 1928-1986 historical returns.  The standard deviations are small and, 
therefore, comparisons of the table entries across the rows and columns can be 
made with some confidence.  We need to be careful when comparing across panels 
A-D (Berkeley Options Database) and panels E-G (Option Metrics). 
 
[TABLE 1A] 
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Most table entries are well below 100%, indicating that there are a number 
of months in which the risk free rate, the price of the index, and the prices of the 
cross section of calls are inconsistent with a market in which there is even one 
risk-averse trader who is marginal in these securities, net of generous transaction 
costs. 
In the top left cell, the middle entry of 73% refers to the index return 
distribution over the period 1928-1986 and option prices over the pre-crash period 
from May 1986 to October 16, 1987.  In 27% of these months, conditions (1.1)-
(1.9) are infeasible and the prices imply stochastic dominance violations despite 
the generous allowance for transaction costs.  The next six entries to the right, 
panels B-G, refer to call prices over the six post-crash periods.  Violations 
increase in panels C-G.  In panel D, all but 4% of the cross sections violate the 
stochastic dominance restrictions.  The option prices in panel D are drawn from 
the reliable Berkeley Options Database and the high incidence of violations 
cannot be attributed to data problems. 
We investigate the robustness of the historical estimate of the index return 
distribution over the period 1928-1986 by re-estimating the historical distribution 
of the index return over the more recent period 1972-1986.  The incidence of 
violations increases in all panels except in panels C and D where it decreases but 
remains high. 
When we use the forward-looking index sample 1987-2006 that includes 
the crash (third row) or the forward-looking index sample 1988-2006 that 
excludes it (fourth row), the pre-crash options exhibit substantially more 
violations.  Our interpretation is that, before the crash, option traders were using 
average historical volatility to price options and were not actively forecasting 
volatility changes.  This interpretation is reinforced in row five, panel A.  The 
GARCH method in forecasting volatility does worse than the first two rows and 
only marginally better than the third and fourth rows. 
In the last three rows, we use the GARCH-based, the IV-based and the 
revised VIX-based conditional index distribution, all based on index returns over 
1972-2006, as explained in Section 2.1.  Of these three methods, GARCH is the 
only one that, in the spirit of this paper, uses information exclusively from the   18
time series of index returns to impose restrictions on the prices of options.  By 
contrast, the IV-based and the revised VIX-based methods use the volatility 
implied in the option prices themselves, irrespective of whether this volatility is 
rational or not.  In particular, implied volatility tends to be higher than realized 
volatility. 
The IV-based method performs better than the revised VIX method.  This 
is surprising because the revised VIX is meant to be a theoretically-motivated 
refinement of the IV method.  The IV-based method performs well in pricing pre-
crash options.  Nevertheless, violations with the IV-based method remain 
surprisingly severe, particularly over 1997-2006. 
 
2.4  Robustness in the single-period case 
Floor traders, institutional investors and broker-assisted investors face different 
transaction costs schedules in trading options.  Are the results robust under 
different transaction costs schedules?  The pattern of violations remains 
essentially the same.  In Table 1A, the number at the top of each cell is the 
percentage of non-violations when the combined one-half bid-ask spread and one-
way trading fee on one option is based on 5 bps of the index price.  We observe a 
large percentage of violations for all index and option price periods.  The number 
at the bottom of each cell is the percentage of non-violations when the combined 
one-half bid-ask spread and one-way trading fee on one option is based on 20 bps 
of the index price.  Predictably, we observe fewer violations for all index and 




Table 1B displays the percentage of violations but now with fixed instead 
of proportional transaction costs.  The pattern of violations is similar to the 
pattern displayed in Table 1A with proportional transaction costs.  In some cells, 
violations increase and in others decrease.  This is surprising because we would 
expect that fixed transaction costs, that imply larger transaction costs for OTM 
calls, would result in fewer violations across the board.  This begs the question   19
whether it is the OTM or the ITM calls that are responsible for the majority of 
violations. 
 
[TABLES 2A and 2B] 
 
Table 2A displays separately violations by ITM calls (top entry) and 
OTM calls (bottom entry) under the proportional transaction costs regime.  In 
almost all cases, there is a higher percentage of violations by OTM calls than by 
ITM calls.
16  Table 2B displays separately the violations due to ITM calls (top 
entry) and OTM calls (bottom entry) under the fixed transaction costs regime.  
Since fixed transaction costs imply higher transaction costs for OTM calls than in 
Table 2A, the violations by OTM calls substantially decrease.  Since fixed 
transaction costs imply lower transaction costs for ITM calls than in Table 2A, 
the violations by ITM calls substantially increase.  In Table 2B, there are fewer 
violations by OTM calls than by ITM calls.  The violations persist when we 
employ the GARCH-based conditional return distribution but substantially 
decrease for both the ITM and OTM calls when we employ the IV-based 
distribution.  However, the fact remains that there are substantial violations by 
OTM calls.  This observation is novel and contradicts the common inference 
drawn from the observed implied volatility smile that the problem primarily lies 
with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution. 
We further investigate the observation made in Table 1A that, when we 
use the IV-based conditional index return distribution, violations remain severe.  
We therefore entertain the possibility that the ATM IV is a biased measure of 
the volatility of the index return distribution. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
                                                 
16 This inference is moderated by the fact that the sample of OTM calls is larger than the sample 
of ITM calls.  Other things equal, the larger the sample, the harder it is to find a monotone 
decreasing pricing kernel that prices the calls.  However, the figures (discussed later on in Section 
2.6) are not subject to this reservation and are consistent with the observation that there is 
substantial mispricing of OTM calls.   20
 
In Table 3, we offset the IV by -2, -1, 1, or 2%, annualized.  In the last 
row, “Best of above”, we report the maximum percentage of feasible month in 
each panel, either without IV offset or with any of the four offsets, allowing the 
offset to be different in each panel.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the 
index is 50 bps.  The one-way transaction costs on the options are proportional.  
The one-way transaction costs rate on the ATM calls is 10 bps of the index price.  
All results use the conditional implied-volatility-based index return distribution 
over the sample period 1972-2006.  In the pre-crash sample, violations disappear 
if we increase the implied volatility by 2%, consistent with received wisdom that 
sample volatility is lower than implied volatility.  In the other subperiods, 
violations persist even under the “Best of above” category.  This is surprising 
because this heavy-handed adjustment of the IV lacks theoretical justification 
and is explicitly designed to eliminate violations.  Furthermore, it is no longer 
consistently the case that sample volatility is lower than implied volatility. 
 
2.5  Stochastic dominance violations in the two-period model 
In the previous sections, we considered feasibility in the context of the single-period 
model.  We established that there are stochastic dominance violations in a 
significant percentage of the months.  Does the percentage of stochastic dominance 
violations increase or decrease as the allowed frequency of trading in the stock and 
bond over the life of the option increases?  In the special case of zero transaction 
costs,  i.i.d. returns, and constant relative risk aversion, it can be theoretically 
shown that the percentage of violations should increase as the allowed frequency of 
trading increases.  However, we cannot provide a theoretical answer if we relax any 
of the above three assumptions.  Therefore, we address the question empirically. 
We compare the percentage of stochastic dominance violations in two 
models, one with one intermediate trading date over the one-month life of the calls 
and another with no intermediate trading dates over the life of the calls.  To this 
end, we partition the 30-day horizon into two 15-day intervals and approximate the 
15-day return distribution by a 61-point kernel density estimate of the 15-day 
returns.  In this instance we base our kernel method on the 15-day returns instead   21
of the 30-day returns.  The assumed transaction costs are as in the base case 
presented in Table 1A.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  
The transaction costs on the options are proportional; for the ATM calls they are 




We may not investigate the effect of intermediate trading by directly 
comparing the results in Tables 1A and 4 because the return generating process 
differs in the two tables since the time horizons are different.  Recall that the 
results in Table 1A are based on a state space of 61 values for 30-day returns.  By 
contrast, the results in Table 4 are based on a state space of 61 values of the 15-day 
returns.  The 30-day return then is the product of two 15-day returns treated as 
i.i.d.  With this process of the 30-day return, we calculate the percentage of months 
without stochastic dominance violations and report the results in Table 4 in 
parentheses. 
The effect of allowing for one intermediate trading date over the life of the 
one-month options is shown by the top entries in Table 4.  These entries are 
contrasted with the bracketed entries which represent the percentage of months 
without stochastic dominance violations when intermediate trading is forbidden.
17  
In most cases, intermediate trading increases the incidence of violations.  We 
conclude that allowance for intermediate trading strengthens the earlier systematic 
evidence of stochastic dominance violations.  In the next section, we obtain further 
insights on the causes of infeasibility, by displaying the options that violate the 
upper and lower bounds on option prices. 
 
2.6  Stochastic dominance bounds 
The stochastic dominance violations reported this far are based on the non-
existence of a trader who is simultaneously marginal in the entire cross section of 
                                                 
17 However, we find that the middle entries in Table 1A are rather similar to the bracketed 
entries in Table 4.  This is an indication that the 30-day return used in Table 1A can be 
reasonably well approximated by convoluting two 15-day returns as in Table 4, bracketed entries.   22
call prices at the beginning of each month.  This requirement effectively rules out 
the possibility that the call options market is segmented.  We entertain the 
possibility of segmented markets by examining violations of stochastic dominance 
through violations of the stochastic dominance bounds (1.10)-(1.11) discussed in 
Section 1.4.  These bounds are derived from the perspective of a trader who is 
marginal in the index, the risk free rate, and only one call option at a time.  
Therefore, these bounds allow for the possibility that the market is segmented.  A 
second advantage of examining violations through these bounds is that the bounds 
apply irrespective of the permitted frequency of trading in the bond and stock 




We calculate these bounds and translate them into bounds on the implied 
volatility of option prices.  In Figures 1-4, we present the upper IV bound based on 
(1.10) and the lower bound based on (1.11).  We present both the bid (circles) and 
ask (crosses) option prices, translated into IVs.  A violation occurs whenever an 
observed call bid price lies above the upper bound or an observed call ask price lies 
below the lower bound. 
In Figures 1 and 2, the 4 panels A-D are based on the Berkeley options data 
base, 1986-1995; in Figures 3 and 4, the 3 panels E-G are based on the Option 
Metrics data base, 1997-2006.  In all cases, the transaction costs rate on the index is 
50 bps. 
The bounds are based on the conditional index return distribution.  First, we 
estimate the unconditional distribution over the period 1972-2006.  Then, for each 
sub period, we calculate the average IV and rescale the volatility of the 
unconditional distribution in each panel accordingly.  Since the bounds are adjusted 
by the implied volatility, irrespective of whether this volatility is rational or not, we 
can draw inferences about the shape of the skew but not about the general level of 
option prices.   23
In Figure 1, panel A, bid prices of some OTM calls lie above the upper 
bound and ask prices of some ITM calls lie below the lower bound.
18  These findings 
are consistent with the results reported in Tables 2A and 2B, panel A, that both 
OTM and ITM pre-crash calls violate stochastic dominance.  The shape of the 
upper and lower bounds in Figures 1, panel A, suggests that if call prices exhibited 
a smile before the crash, there would be fewer violations.  This is a novel finding 
because pre-crash option prices have been documented to follow the BSM model 
reasonably well and this has been interpreted as evidence that they are correctly 
priced. 
Panels B-G dispel another common misconception, namely, that the 
observed smile is too steep after the crash.  In fact, panel G illustrates that there is 
hardly a smile in the period 2003-2006.  Post-crash violations are due to both ITM 
and OTM calls; sometimes bid prices are above the upper bound and ask prices are 
below the lower bound.  These findings are consistent with the results reported in 
the tables. 
In Figure 2, panels C and D, there are very few violations, consistent with 
the results in Tables 1A and 1B, when the conditional index return distribution is 
based on IV.  The good performance does not carry over into subsequent periods.  
In Figures 3, panels E and F, several bid call prices over the period 1997-2003 lie 
way above the bounds.  This is true for both ITM and OTM calls.  This is an 
altogether different pattern of violations than in the earlier panels A-D.  In 
interpreting the high incidence of violations of option prices over the period 1997-
2003 in the tables, we were conservative because of concerns regarding the quality 
of the Option Metrics database.  The figures provide a clearer picture.  If the 
violations were the result of low quality of the data, then we would observe roughly 
as many violations of the lower bound as we do of the upper bound.  This is not the 
case.  Most of the violations are violations of the upper bound.  The decrease in 
violations over the post-crash period 1988-1995 (panels B-D) is followed by a 
substantial increase in violations over 1997-2003 (panels E and F).  This is a novel 
                                                 
18 Bids with zero implied volatility (not asks, which are always positive) imply that the price is so 
low that there does not exist a positive implied volatility solving the Black-Scholes equation.  
These bids do not violate the bounds as they do not present utility-improving opportunities.   24
finding and casts doubts on the hypothesis that the options market is becoming 
more rational over time, particularly after the crash. 
In results not reported, we estimated the bounds of Figures 1-4 with the 
unconditional distributions, both historical and forward-looking, and compared the 
bounds to the observed option prices.  The pattern is broadly similar to the one 
exhibited by the conditional distributions presented in the paper.  In particular, the 
estimated bounds exhibited a smile in the pre-crash period as in Figure 1, panel A.  
We also observed a decrease in violations over the post-crash period 1988-1995 
followed by an increase in violations over 1997-2003. 
 
 
3  Concluding Remarks 
 
We document widespread violations of stochastic dominance in the one-month S&P 
500 index options market over the period 1986-2006, before and after the October 
1987 stock market crash.  We do not impose a parametric model on the index 
return distribution but estimate it as the (smoothed) histogram of the sample 
distribution, using seven different index return samples: two samples before the 
crash, one long and one short; two forward-looking samples, one that includes the 
crash and one that excludes it; one sample adjusted for GARCH-forecasted 
conditional volatility; one adjusted for implied volatility; and one sample adjusted 
for VIX-forecasted conditional volatility.  We allow the market to be incomplete 
and also imperfect by introducing generous transaction costs in trading the index 
and the options. 
Evidence of stochastic dominance violations means that any trader can 
increase her expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-cost trade.  We consider a 
market with heterogeneous agents and investigate the restrictions on option prices 
imposed by a particular class of utility-maximizing economic agents that we simply 
refer to as traders.  We do not make the restrictive assumption that all agents 
belong to the class of the utility-maximizing traders.  Thus, our results are robust 
and unaffected by the presence of agents with beliefs, endowments, preferences,   25
trading restrictions, and transaction costs schedules that differ from those of the 
utility-maximizing traders modeled in this paper. 
Our empirical design allows for three implications associated with state 
dependence.  First, each month we search for a pricing kernel to price the cross 
section of one-month options without imposing restrictions on the time series 
properties of the pricing kernel, month by month.  Thus, we allow the pricing 
kernel to be state dependent.  Second, we allow for intermediate trading; a trader’s 
wealth on the expiration date of the options is generally a function not only of the 
price of the market index on that date but also of the entire path of the index level 
thereby rendering the pricing kernel state dependent.  Third, we allow the volatility 
of the index return to be state dependent and employ the estimated conditional 
volatility. 
Even though pre-crash option prices conform to the BSM model reasonably 
well, once the constant volatility input to the BSM formula is judiciously chosen, 
this does not speak on the rationality of option prices.  Our novel finding is that 
pre-crash options are incorrectly priced if the distribution of the index return is 
estimated from time-series data even with a variety of statistical adjustments.  Our 
derived option bounds exhibit a smile and this suggests that pre-crash option prices 
would violate these bounds less frequently if they exhibited a smile too.  Our 
interpretation of these results is that, before the crash, option traders were 
extensively using the BSM pricing model and the dictates of this model were 
imposed on the option prices even though these dictates were not necessarily 
consistent with the time-series behavior of index prices. 
There are substantial violations by OTM calls under both the fixed and 
proportional transaction costs regimes.  This observation is novel and contradicts 
the common inference drawn from the observed implied volatility smile that the 
problem primarily lies with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution.  We 
do not find evidence that the observed smile is too steep after the crash. 
If the violations by ITM and OTM calls were the result of the low quality of 
the data, then we would observe roughly as many violations of the lower bound as 
we do of the upper bound.  This is not the case.  Most of the violations are 
violations of the upper bound.  The decrease in violations over the post-crash period   26
1988-1995 is followed by a substantial increase in violations over 1997-2003.  This is 
a novel finding and casts doubts on the hypothesis that the options market is 
becoming more rational over time, particularly after the crash. 
By providing an integrated approach to the pricing of options that allows for 
incomplete and imperfect markets, we provide testable restrictions on option prices 
that include the BSM model as a special case.  We reviewed the empirical evidence 
on the prices of S&P 500 index options.  The economic restrictions are violated 
surprisingly often, suggesting that the mispricing of these options cannot be entirely 
attributed to the fact that the BSM model does not allow for market 
incompleteness and realistic transaction costs. 
In this paper, we allowed for some implications associated with non-priced 
state variables.  Several extant models addressed the inconsistencies with the BSM 
model and the violations of monotonicity of the pricing kernel by introducing priced 
state variables and/or exploring alternative specifications of preferences.  For 
example, Brennan, Liu and Xia (2006) rejected an explanation of index option 
prices based on a pricing kernel that is a nonlinear function of the market return, 
the interest rate and the Sharpe ratio.  It remains an open and challenging topic for 
future research to endogenously generate the process of the risk premia associated 
with these state variables in the context of an equilibrium model of the macro 
economy and explain on a month-by-month basis the cross section of S&P 500 
index option prices. 
Our search for a trader who is simultaneously marginal in the stock, risk free 
rate, and the entire cross-section of one-month call options does not address the 
possibility that equilibrium exists but in a segmented market.  In Figures 1-4, we 
partially allowed for the possibility that equilibrium exists but the market is 
segmented by searching for a trader that is simultaneously marginal in the stock, 
risk free rate, and just one one-month call option at a time.  Even in this case, we 
report several violations.  In practice, individual investors (our “traders”) may face 
additional restrictions imposed by their brokers in writing options, beyond the 
restrictions that we imposed through trading costs and bid-ask spreads.  It remains 
an open and challenging topic for future research to investigate the extent to which   27
more severe market segmentation or imperfections can reconcile the results 
presented in this paper.   28
Appendix A 
 
We allow for three trading dates,  0,1,2 t = , at the beginning, middle and end of the 
month-long period ending with the expiration of the options.  We define the stock 
returns over the first sub-period as  ( ) δ ≡ + 11 0 1/ ii zS S , corresponding to the 
I states on date one,  = 1,..., iI .  We assume that the returns over the two sub-
periods are independent.  Thus, the stock returns over the second sub-period, 
() δ ≡+ = 22 1 1 / , 1,..., ki k i zS S k I , are independent of i.  There are 
2 I  states on date 
two,  == 1,..., , 1,..., iI kI . 
We define the state-dependent marginal utility of wealth out of the bond 
account on each one of the three trading dates as  () 0
B M ,  ( ) 1
B
i M  and  ( ) 2
B
ik M .  
Likewise, we define the state-dependent marginal utility of wealth out of the stock 
account on each of the three trading dates as  ( ) 0
S M ,  ( ) 1
S
i M  and  ( ) 2
S
ik M .  The 
conditions on positivity and monotonicity of the marginal utility of wealth out of 
the bond and stock accounts at  = 0,1 t  are given by equations (1.1)-(1.4).  The 
corresponding conditions at  = 2 t  are: 
 
( ) 2 0, , 1,...,
B
ik Mi k I >=      ( A . 1 )  
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 2 2 ... 2 ... 2 0, 1,...,
SS S S
i i ik iI MM M M iI ≥≥ ≥ ≥> = . (A.2) 
 
On each date, the trader may transfer funds between the bond and stock 
accounts and incur transaction costs.  Conditions (1.5) and (1.6) hold.  The 
corresponding condition at  = 2 t  is: 
 
() () () () () −≤ ≤ + = 12 2 12 , , 1 , . . . ,
BS B
ik ik ik kM M kM i k I . (A.3) 
 
Conditions (1.7) and (1.8) on the marginal rate of substitution between 
dates zero and one hold.  The corresponding conditions between dates one and two 
are as follows: 
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Condition (1.9) is replaced by: 
 
() () () () ()
11
02 0 , 1 , . . . ,
II
BB B
j j i k ik ikj j j
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Pk M M X Pk M j J ππ
==
−≤ ≤ + = ∑∑ . (A.6) 
 
The probability of state ( ) , ik  is  ik ππ  because, by assumption, the stock returns are 
independent over the two sub-periods. 
In our empirical analysis, we report the percentage of months in which 
conditions (1.1)-(1.8) and (A.1)-(A.6) are feasible and, therefore, stochastic 
dominance is ruled out.   30
Appendix B 
 
B.1  Berkeley options database 
The Berkeley Options Database contains all minute-by-minute quotes and trades of 
the European options and futures on the S&P 500 index from April 2, 1986 to 
December 29, 1995.  Details on this database are found in Jackwerth and 
Rubinstein (1996), Jackwerth (2000) and below. 
 
B.1.1  Index level 
Traders typically use the index futures market rather than the cash market to 
hedge their option positions.  The reason is that the cash market prices lag futures 
prices by a few minutes due to lags in reporting transactions of the constituent 
stocks in the index.  We check this claim by regressing the index on each of the 
first twenty minute lags of the futures price.  The single regression with the highest 
adjusted R
2 is assumed to indicate the lag for a given day.  The median lag of the 
index over the 1542 days from 1986 to 1992 is seven minutes.  Because the index is 
stale, we compute a futures-based index for each minute from the futures market as 
()
1
0 1 SR F δ
− =+ , where F is the futures price at the option expiration.  For each 
day, we use the median interest rate R implied by all futures quotes and trades and 
the index level at that time.  We approximate the dividend yield δ by assuming 
that the dividend amount and timing expected by the market were identical to the 
dividends actually paid on the S&P 500 index.  However, some limited tests 
indicate that the choice of the index does not seem to affect the results of this 
paper. 
 
B.1.2  Interest rate 
We compute implied interest rates embedded in the European put-call parity 
relation.  Armed with option quotes, we calculate separate lending and borrowing 
interest returns from put-call parity where we use the above future-based index.  
For each expiration date, we assign a single lending and borrowing rate to each 
day, which is the median of all daily observations across all strike prices.  We then 
use the average of these two interest rates as our daily spot rate for the particular   31
time to expiration.  Finally, we obtain the interpolated interest rates from the 
implied forward curve.  If there is data missing, we assume that the spot rate curve 
can be extrapolated horizontally for the shorter and longer times-to-expiration.   
Again, some limited tests indicate that the results are not affected by the exact 
choice of the interest rate. 
 
B.1.3  Option prices 
We use only bid and ask prices on call options.  For each day retained in the 
sample, we aggregate the quotes to the minute and pick the minute between 9:00-
11:00 AM with the most quotes as our cross section for the month. 
We use only call options with 30 days to expiration which occur once every 
month during our sample.  We also trim the sample to allow for moneyness levels 
between 0.90 and 1.05.  Cross sections with fewer than 5 option quotes are 
discarded.  We also eliminate the cross sections right after the crash of 1987 as the 
data is noisy and restart the sample with the cross section expiring on July 15, 
1988. 
 
B.1.4  Arbitrage violations 
In the process of setting up the database, we check for a number of errors which 
might have been contained in the original minute-by-minute transaction level data.  
We eliminate a few obvious data-entry errors as well as a few quotes with excessive 
spreads—more than 200 cents for options and 20 cents for futures.  General 
arbitrage violations are eliminated from the data set.  We also check for violations 
of vertical and butterfly spreads.  Within each minute, we keep the largest set of 
option quotes which satisfies the restriction 
(1 ) max[0, (1 ) / ] ii SC SK R δδ +≥ ≥ +− . 
Early exercise is not an issue as the S&P 500 options are European and the 
discreteness of quotes and trades only introduces a stronger upward bias in the 
midpoint implied volatilities for deep-out-of-the-money puts (moneyness less than 
0.6) which we do not use in our empirical work.  We start out with 107 raw cross 
sections and are left with 98 final cross sections. 
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B.2  Option Metrics database 
The Option Metrics Database contains indicative end-of-day European call and put 
option quotes on the S&P 500 index from January 2, 1997 to May 31, 2006.  In 
merging the Option Metrics Database with the Berkeley Options Database, we 
follow the above procedure as much as possible, given the closing bid and ask prices 
that the Option Metrics Database provides.  Therefore, only departures and 
innovations from the above procedure are noted. 
 
B.2.1  Index level 
As the closing (noon) index price, we use the price implied by the closing (noon) 
futures price. 
 
B.2.2  Interest rate 
As we cannot arrive at consistently positive interest rates implied by option prices, 
we use T-bill rates instead, obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Economic Research Database (FRED
®). 
 
B.2.3  Option prices 
In the final sample, only call and put options with at least 100 traded contracts are 
included.  We calculate a hypothetical noon option cross section from the closing 
cross section and the index observed at noon and the close.  Here we assume that 
the implied volatilities do not change between noon and the close.  We start out 
with 109 raw cross sections and are left with 108 final cross sections. The time to 
expiration is 29 days. 
 
B.3.  S&P 500 information bulletin 
We obtain the historical daily record of the S&P 500 index and its daily dividend 
record over the period 1928-2006 from the S&P 500 Information Bulletin.  Before 
April 1982, dividends are estimated from monthly dividend yields. 
 
B.4  VIX index We use the revised CBOE Volatility Index (VIX).  The revised VIX is 100 times 
the forecast of the annualized 30-day volatility of the S&P 500 index.  It is a model-
independent forecast based on S&P 500 index options with 1-month and 2-month 
expiration and wide range of in-the-moneyness.  The index has been back-filled by 
the CBOE and is currently available from 1990 to the present.  Note that VIX is 




The  GARCH (1,1) special case of the Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera (1991) semi 
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where  is an unknown distribution with zero mean and unit variance.  ( 0,1 g
The parameters ( ω α β ,,  are estimated by maximum likelihood under the 
(false) assumption that  ( )
1/2 .. . 0 ,1 t hi i d N ε
− ∼ .  Then the time series { } ε
−1/2
tt h  is 
calculated and the true density  ( ) 0,1 g  is estimated as the histogram of all the time 
series observations.  The histogram is being smoothed by our kernel methods in the 
same way as all the other distributions in order to keep the procedures comparable. 
One may consider re-estimating the parameters ( ) ,, ω α β  by maximum 
likelihood, replacing the assumption that  ( )
1/2 ... 0 ,1 t hi i d N ε
− ∼  with the assumption 
that  , where  (
1/2 ... 0 ,1 t hi i d g ε
−   ∼ ) ( ) 0,1 g    is the estimated density in the last step 
above.  Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera (1991) showed by simulation that this 
additional step is unnecessary in practice. 
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Table 1A 
Percentage of months without stochastic dominance violations with proportional 
transaction costs 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross-section of option prices.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The 
transaction costs on the options are proportional.  In each row, the one-way transaction costs rate on 
the ATM calls is 5 bps of the index price (top entries), 10 bps (bold, middle entries), or 20 bps 
(bottom entries).  The bracketed numbers in the first row are bootstrap standard deviations of the 
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Table 1B 
Percentage of months without stochastic dominance violations with fixed 
transaction costs 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross-section of option prices.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The 
transaction costs on the options are fixed.  In each row, the one-way transaction costs rate on the 
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Table 2A 
Percentage of months without stochastic dominance violations with proportional 
transaction costs—ITM and OTM calls separately 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross-section of ITM calls (top entry) and OTM calls (bottom entry).  The one-way transaction 
costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The 
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Conditional index return 
distribution, 1972-2006, 
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Table 2B 
Percentage of months without stochastic dominance violations with fixed 
transaction costs—ITM and OTM calls separately 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross-section of ITM calls (top entry) and OTM calls (bottom entry).  The one-way transaction 
costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The 
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Table 3 
Percentage of months without stochastic dominance violations using conditional 
implied-volatility-based index return distributions with ± 2% offset 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross-section of option prices.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The 
one-way transaction costs on the options are proportional.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the 
ATM calls is 10 bps of the index price.  All results use the conditional implied-volatility-based index 
return distribution over the sample period 1972-2006.  Four offsets are used to change the implied 
ATM volatility by -2, -1, 1, or 2%, annualized.  The bold results “Best of above” count a monthly 
cross section as feasible if feasibility is established either without implied volatility offset or with any 






















Number  of  Months    15 29 28 26 35 37 36 
Implied Vol - 2%  13  55  71  50  0  5  0 
Implied  Vol  -1%  47 72 93 69 29 30  6 
Implied  Vol  87 83 96 73 29 38 19 
Implied  Vol  +  1%  93 76 96 65 26 32 19 
Implied Vol + 2%  100  72  86  65  23  30  19 
Best of above  100  83 96 73 29 38 19   44
Table 4 
Percentage of months without stochastic dominance violations in the two-period case 
The table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are absent in 
the cross section of option prices when one intermediate trading date is allowed over the life of the 
one-month options.  The one-way transaction costs rate on the index is 50 bps.  The transaction 
costs on the options are proportional; for the ATM calls they are 10 bps of the index price.  In 
parentheses, the table displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance violations are 
absent in the case when no intermediate trading is allowed over the life of the one-month options.  
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Figure 1: Bound violations over May 1986 to October 1987 and July 1988 to March 1991 
The observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) call prices, as implied volatilities, are plotted as functions 
of the moneyness.  The upper and lower option bounds are based on the index sample distribution 
1972-2006, rescaled with the conditional volatility of the relevant panel.  The transaction costs rate 
on the index is 50 bps. 
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Figure 2: Bound violations over April 1991 to August 1993 and September 1993 to December 1995 
The observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) call prices, as implied volatilities, are plotted as functions 
of the moneyness.  The upper and lower option bounds are based on the index sample distribution 
1972-2006, rescaled with the conditional volatility of the relevant panel.  The transaction costs rate 
on the index is 50 bps. 
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Figure 3: Bound violations over February 1997 to December 1999 and February 2000 to May 2003 
The observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) call prices, as implied volatilities, are plotted as functions 
of the moneyness.  The upper and lower option bounds are based on the index sample distribution 
1972-2006, rescaled with the conditional volatility of the relevant panel.  The transaction costs rate 
on the index is 50 bps. 
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Figure 4: Bound violations over June 2003 to May 2006 
The observed bid (circles) and ask (crosses) call prices, as implied volatilities, are plotted as functions 
of the moneyness.  The upper and lower option bounds are based on the index sample distribution 
1972-2006, rescaled with the conditional volatility of the relevant panel.  The transaction costs rate 
on the index is 50 bps. 
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